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Conspiracy: The Requisite Proof
State v. Dent, 198 Neb. 110, 251 N.W.2d 734 (1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
Conspiracy has been referred to as an "elastic, sprawling and
pervasive offense .... [It] is so vague that it almost defies defini-
tion."' Despite the inherent vagueness of the crime, it may be
said to require an agreement between two or more persons, which
constitutes the criminal act, and an intent to thereby achieve a cer-
tain unlawful act.2  However, it is difficult to divide conspiracy
into the elements of criminal act and criminal intent because the
act of agreement, since it is volitional, also requires an intent.3
Some jurisdictions also require an overt act in furtherance of the
agreement; 4 however, if the agreement is established, virtually any
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy will suffice.5
1. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
2. W. LEFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIvINAL LAw, § 61, at 453
(1972). The objective of a conspiracy may also be the doing of a law-
ful act by unlawful means. However, that portion of the offense is
not pertinent to the discussion herein. Id.
3. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. Rsv. 624, 632-35
(1941); Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HAav. L.
REv. 920, 935 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. The two
types of intent involved in the offense of conspiracy focus on different
issues, although practically they overlap. Since every conspiracy in-
volves an agreement, it is necessary to establish that each of the par-
ties charged had an intent to enter into an agreement. The issue here
is whether the separate intentions of each party met on common
ground to effect an agreement. If this is established, the subsequent
issue raised is whether the purpose agreed upon involves a criminal
intent. Harno, supra at 631.
4. W. LEFAV & A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at 476. In Nebraska, proof of
an overt act is an element of the offense of conspiracy as defined in
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-301 (Reissue 1975) which provides:
If two or more persons conspire to commit any felony or to
defraud the State of Nebraska in any manner or for any pur-
pose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each of the parties in such conspiracy
shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or impris-
oned in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex not
more than two years or both.
See Platt v. State, 143 Neb. 131, 8 N.W.2d 849 (1943).
5. W. LEFAvE & A. ScoTt, supra note 2, at 476-78.
CONSPIRACY
The elements of conspiracy are difficult to analyze because of
the predominantly mental nature of the crime.6 For this reason,
a great deal of uncertainty exists concerning the quantum of evi-
dence necessary to prove the elements of conspiracy. This uncer-
tainty is compounded by the clandestine nature of conspiracy and
the difficulty of producing direct evidence.8 Thus courts have held
that a charge of conspiracy may be sustained by proof of surround-
ing facts and circumstances which infers clear cooperation between
the parties.9 However, it has been suggested that courts have oc-
casionally been too enthusiastic in their reliance on circumstantial
evidence. 10
Recently in the case of State v. Dent" the Nebraska Supreme
Court was directly confronted with issues regarding the quantum
of evidence necessary to prove the elements of conspiracy. The
purpose of this article is to analyze the court's opinion, focusing
both upon what the court said and what it did not say, and to con-
sider the possible implications of the court's holding.
II. FACTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT
On October 4, 1975, defendant Bradley Bodeman received a
phone call at his residence in Grand Island, Nebraska, from defen-
dant Gerald Dent, who placed the call from Lincoln, Nebraska.12 In
summary, the conversation revealed that Bodeman wanted six or
seven more items from Dent and that the two would meet at the
Ramada Inn in York, Nebraska.' 3 The identity of the items was
not disclosed. A third person, William E. Burke, was at the Bode-
man residence for the purpose of purchasing cocaine when the
phone conversation occurred, although Burke apparently left the
6. Harno, supra note 3, at 632.
7. W. LEFAVE & A. ScOTT, supra note 2, at 456.
8. Developments, supra note 3, at 933.
9. Id. A common purpose among two or more persons to commit a crime
need not be shown by positive evidence but may be inferred from the
circumstances surrounding the act and from the defendant's subse-
quent- conduct. State v. Lacy, 195 Neb. 299, 237 N.W.2d 650 (1976);
State v. Claire, 188 Neb. 373, 196 N.W.2d 519 (1972).
10. Cousens, Agreement as an Element in Conspiracy, 23 VA. L. REv. 898,
910 (1937); Developments, supra note 3, at 933-34.
11. 198 Neb. 110, 251 N.W.2d 734 (1977).
12. The phone call was intercepted and recorded by a wiretap on the
phone at defendant Bodeman's residence. The order authorizing the
wiretap was not an issue on appeal. Id.
13. The telephone conversation between Bodeman and Dent was recorded
and then transcribed. Bodeman was identified as the first speaker
and Dent as the second speaker. The substance of the transcription
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residence without purchasing any drugs. 14 Approximately two
hours after the telephone conversation, a highway patrolman
viewed a meeting, apparently between Dent and Bodeman, at the
Ramada Inn parking lot in York, Nebraska. Dent was positively
identified by the patrolman later when he stopped the Dent vehicle
to issue a traffic citation. Bodeman was identified only by his ye-
follows in part:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:
Second Speaker:
First Speaker:Secnd~r Speaker:
• .. I wanted to get some more of them.
Yeah, when?
Well, as soon as I could.
Hmmm.
We got a whole bunch of shit going on.
We're going to be making a bunch of
money, and I got a bunch of "LB's" coming
in tomorrow and just all kind of shit's
breaking loose.
Oh .. .really.... well, when do you
want it? ... Or do you?
Well, how many you got left?
Ten.
Ten?
Um huh.
I'd sure like to get six or seven of them
for a couple of days...
O.K., yeah, O.K. Right. Can I send them
back with my brother, Randy (??) ....
When's he coming back?
He's here right now. He's going to be going
back either tonight or tomorrow. (unin-
telligible . . . background noise)
Well, shit, I'm damned near tempted to run
up there, but . . . [expletive deleted]!
Meet in York (chuckling) ..
Meet in York? (laughter) You weren't
really thinking about tonight, were you?
Well, yeah.
There's a Ramada Inn there .... why
don't we just meet in front of the Ramada
Inn?
In about .... I'm going to take off in about
ten minutes.
Fine, fine, I'll meet you there.
What? . . . . How many do you want?
Seven.
Seven. What price is that?
Well, that's up to you.
Well, (unintelligible... background noise)
... (either fifty-five or sixty-five).
Fine, fine. Fine. Fine. Are you going to
be in your little car?
Yeah.
Bill of Exceptions, vol. 2, at 280 (exhibit No. 5). See also Brief of
Appellee at 9.
14. 198 Neb. at 111, 251 N.W.2d~at 735.
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hicle. The patrolman did not personally observe what transpired
during the meeting.15 At approximately midnight that evening,
Burke returned to the Bodeman residence and purchased four
grams of white powder which he apparently understood to be co-
caine, although he was later unsure that the substance actually was
cocaine.
Bodeman and Dent were charged with conspiracy to distribute
cocaine. The case was tried to the court and the defendants were
found guilty.
III. ANALYSIS
In a per curiam opinion, a majority of the Nebraska Supreme
Court held that the circumstantial evidence, as summarized above,
was "substantial" and thus sufficient to sustain the conviction. The
court concluded that the defendants entered into an agreement to
"participate in the chain of distribution" of cocaine. According to
the court, the specific object, which both defendants intended to
achieve by their agreement, was the distribution of cocaine to third
persons through Bodeman. The meeting at the Ramada Inn in
York, Nebraska, was viewed as an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The object of the conspiracy was achieved when Bode-
man delivered the cocaine to Burke.16
The conclusions reached by the majority of the court were
enunciated without explanation. The court's holding raises several
issues regarding the quantum of evidence necessary to prove the
requisite elements of conspiracy; specifically, the identity of the
specific object of the agreement and the intent to accomplish that
object.
A. The Specific Object of the Agreement
In a dissenting opinion, Justice McGowan addressed perhaps the
more obvious question raised by the holding of the court. It is
axiomatic that when a conspiracy to commit a specific offense is
charged, in order to sustain a conviction, there must be sufficient
evidence to prove that the object of the agreement between the
conspirators was in fact the commission of that offense.17 Justice
15. These facts raise an unanswered question as to why the patrolman
did not then intervene in the purported drug transaction.
16. 198 Neb. at 112-13, 251 N.W.2d at 735-36.
17. People v. Smith, 22 Ill. App. 3d 377, 317 N.E.2d 300 (1974) (reversing
the conviction of conspiracy to commit perjury as the evidence was
insufficient to prove that the object of the agreement was to commit
the offense of perjury, as defined by statute); State v, Buttner, 180
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McGowan's disagreement with the majority focused on the quan-
tum of evidence necessary to prove that the specific object of an
agreement between the defendants was the commission of the of-
fense charged.' 8
As Justice McGowan perceived the evidence, the State merely
proved that the defendants agreed to sell and deliver something.
He reasoned that since the evidence failed to identify the substance
which the defendants agreed to sell and deliver, the object of the
alleged conspiratorial agreement was sheer speculation. He con-
cluded that the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit the
specific offense of distribution of cocaine should not be sustained.19
The respective conclusions of the majority and the dissent in
this case diverged not on a substantive point of law, but rather
on the inferences drawn from the evidence. Although unexplained
in the opinion, the majority of the court seems to have implicitly
relied on a ladder of inferences which eventually led to the conclu-
sion that the object of the agreement between the defendants was
Neb. 529, 143 N.W.2d 907 (1966) (sustaining a demurrer to the charge
of conspiracy because the indictment did not state facts sufficient to
show that the object of the conspiracy was to commit a felony); Peo-
ple v. Friedlander, 280 N.Y. 437, 21 N.E.2d 498 (1939) (reversing the
conviction of conspiracy to violate wage and hour provisions of the
labor law because the evidence was insufficient to prove that the ob-ject of the agreement between the defendants was to violate the law).
The conspiracy charge in Dent was based upon the provisions of
NEs. REv. STAT. § 28-4,129 (Reissue 1975) which provides:
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense
defined in sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142 shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment or fine, or
both, which may not exceed the maximum punishment pre-
scribed for the offense, the commission of which was the ob-ject of the attempt or conspiracy.
The substantive offense of delivery of a controlled substance is de-
fined in NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-4,125 (Reissue 1975) which provides, in
pertinent part: "Except as authorized by Sections 28-459 and 28-4,115
to 28-4,142, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intention-
ally: (a) To manufacture, distribute, deliver, dispense or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, deliver or dispense, a controlled sub-
stance . .. ."
18. 198 Neb. at 113-15, 251 N.W.2d at 736-37 (McCown, J., dissenting).
19. The majority opinion now holds in effect that evidence of an
agreement between two persons to sell and deliver unidenti-
fied property which is possibly or even probably illicit or con-
traband, followed by some act, is sufficient to establish a con-
spiracy to distribute cocaine or any other controlled substance.
The holding means also that the State may prove a conspiracy
to commit a specific offense by proving an agreement to com-
mit any act which is possibly or even probably unlawful or
criminal.
Id. at 114, 251 N.W.2d at 736,
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the distribution of cocaine. At the base of these inferences appear
to be two facts. First, Bodeman did not sell cocaine to Burke
earlier in the evening before Bodeman went to York, Nebraska.
Second, Bodeman did sell Burke a substance, purportedly cocaine,
later that evening after he returned. from York. Implicit in the
court's conclusion lies the inference that Bodeman received the co-
caine from Dent in York. From this the court apparently inferred
that the telephone conversation involved an agreement to sell and
buy cocaine.20
Justice McGowan was not persuaded that these inferences were
sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dants agreed to distribute cocaine.21 Justice McGowan's hesitancy
to support the ladder of inferences relied on by the majority was
well-founded.22 One need not use much imagination to interpret
the facts presented in a manner consistent with the defendants'
innocence.23 Although it is true that conspiracy convictions are
often based on circumstantial evidence,24 this proposition does not
20. Id. at 112, 251 N.W.2d at 735-36.
21. "Any connection between Dent and whatever the transaction was be-
tween Bodeman and Burke rests upon a web of inferences which the
evidence does not support." Id. at 114, 251 N.W.2d at 736 (McCown,
J., dissenting).
22. The inference-on-inference rule has been rejected by most courts.
However, the underlying principle which is rooted in the standard of
reasonable doubt, continues to have vitality. The notion remains that
an inference cannot be based upon evidence which is uncertain or
speculative or which raises merely a conjecture or possibility. See
Shutt v. State, 233 Ind. 169, 117 N.E.2d 892 (1954); State v. Earlywine,
191 Neb. 533, 215 N.W.2d 895 (1974); J. WIGMORE, EVMIENCE, § 41 (and
cases cited therein).
This notion is consistent with the rule regarding circumstantial evi-
dence enunciated by Justice McGowan, that:
Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon in a criminal
prosecution, the circumstances proven must relate directly to
the guilty [sic] of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt
in such a way as to exclude any other reasonable conclusion.
Any fact or circumstance reasonably susceptible of two inter-
pretations must be resolved most favorably to the accused.
198 Neb. at 114-15, 251 N.W.2d at 736 (quoting from State v. Faircloth,
181 Neb. 333, 336, 148 N.W.2d 187, 189 (1967)).
23. An equally reasonable interpretation of the facts is that Bodeman pos-
sessed the substance he sold to Burke for some time before Dent tele-
phoned. It is just as feasible that Burke didn't have the cash to pur-
chase the substance earlier in the evening. The court's initial infer-
ence that since Bodeman didn't sell the substance to Burke early that
evening, Bodeman must not have possessed any drugs to sell at that
time, is itself a mere suspicion. Thus the inferences which the major-
ity deduced from that wobbly foundation fall far short of a standard
of reasonable doubt.
24. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
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affect the constitutional right of an accused to be convicted only
if the circumstances exclude all reasonable doubt of innocence.
25
B. The Requisite State of Mind
The holding of the court in this case raises a second issue regard-
ing the quantum of evidence necessary to prove the elements of
conspiracy. This issue focuses on the requirement that each con-
spirator must enter into the agreement to commit a specific un-
lawful act possessing the requisite state of mind.26 The court here
holds that both parties "intended and expected" the object of the
agreement, which was the distribution of cocaine to third persons
through Bodeman, to be accomplished.27 Although the language
used by the court supports an adherence to the intent requirement,
the facts relied on by the court to reach its holding cast some doubt
on the actual nature of the mental state required for conspiracy.
One of the most difficult problems encountered in conspiracy
law is that of determining when a venture of one person has been
adopted by another so that it can be found to be the object of a
joint agreement.28 The facts of this case, accepting for the purpose
of analysis the inferences on which the court apparently relied,29
raise precisely such a problem. Although Bodeman may have in-
tended to resell the alleged cocaine to third persons, it is not clear
that Dent also intended the resale. The evidence could logically
support a finding that Dent knew that Bodeman intended to resell
the alleged cocaine.30  The issue in this regard is whether mere
25. The United States Supreme Court in in re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970), specifically held that the reasonable doubt standard is an es-
sential requirement of any criminal proceeding if it is to fulfill the
due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. This holding
was reiterated in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
It could be argued that the standard of review articulated and ap-
plied by the majority in Dent significantly weakens the reasonable
doubt standard. The majority stated: "Although the evidence is in
part circumstantial, a conviction may rest upon circumstantial evi-
dence if it is substantial." 198 Neb. at 112, 251 N.W.2d at 735.
The majority's standard of reasonable doubt is in sharp contrast
to that applied by the dissent and arguably with that guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. See note 22 supra.
26. See notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
27. 198 Neb. at 112-13, 251 N.W.2d at 736.
28. Developments, supra note 3, at 930-31; see 53 CoLTum. L. REV. 228
(1953).
29. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
30. This knowledge may be inferred from the telephone conversation dur-
ing which Bodeman indicated he was going to make some money be-
cause several "LB's" were coming into town. See note 13 supra.
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knowledge, on the part of a supplier, of another's illegal venture
is sufficient to prove he intended to achieve the object of that ven-
ture.31 In other words, the factual problem is whether Dent's
knowledge that Bodeman might resell the alleged cocaine which
Dent purportedly sold him is sufficient to convict Dent of conspir-
ing with Bodeman to distribute cocaine to third persons. Generally
courts have required "something more" than mere knowledge, but
they have had difficulty in establishing a rule to identify the "some-
thing more" that is required.3 2
Judge Learned Hand considered the issue in United States v.
Peoni,8 which involved facts somewhat similar to those in Dent.
In reversing the conspiracy conviction, even though the supplier
knew that the illegal goods would be resold by the buyer, Judge
Learned Hand stated that the accused must "in some sort associate
himself with the venture, [so] that he participate in it as something
that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make
it succeed."34 This test, which has been labeled the "stake in the
venture test,"35 has not, per se, been widely accepted, 6 except
as it stands for the proposition that mere knowledge is not enough
to convict one of conspiring to commit the object of another's il-
legal venture.3 7
The issue of what must be proved before a seller can be found
to have entered into a conspiratorial agreement, the purpose of
which is to further the buyer's illegal venture, was considered by
the United States Supreme Court in Direct Sales Co. v. United
States.38 The Court held that it is intent which is the additional
31. W. LEFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at 466-68; Developments, supra
note 3, at 931-33.
32. Developments, supra note 3, at 930-31.
33. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). In this case the defendant sold counter-
feit bills to Regno who sold the same bills to Dorsey. Peoni was
charged with conspiracy with Regno. The object of the conspiracy
was to transfer possession of bills to third persons like Dorsey.
34. Id. at 402.
35. Developments, supra note 3, at 931. The test was articulated slightly
differently in United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), aff'd
on other grounds, 311 U.S. 205 (1940), where the court stated that the
defendant "must in some sense promote their venture himself, make
it his own, have a stake in its outcome." Id. at 581.
36. Developments, supra note 3, at 931. See Direct Sales Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943); United States v. Tramaglino, 197 F.2d 928(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 864 (1952); Johns v. United States,
195 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1952). But see United States v. Spanos, 462 F.2d
1012 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471, 477 (2d
Cir. 1967) (citing Peoni with apparent approval).
37. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1943); Develop-
ments, supra note 3, at 931.
38. 319 U.S. 703 (1943).
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"something" beyond mere knowledge which must be proven.3 9
While indicating that the "stake in the venture" test may be rele-
vant to a finding of intent, the Court determined that other factors
should also be considered. 40  The primary factor which the Court
considered was whether the goods supplied were in themselves
illegal or restricted.4 1 But the Court indicated that not every in-
stance of sale of restricted goods, in which the seller knows of the
buyer's illegal venture, would support a charge of conspiracy. 42 In
support of this proposition, the Court specifically referred to single
or casual transactions in which the seller was indifferent to the
illegal purpose underlying the buyer's purchase.4 3 These factors,
along with references to the "stake in the venture test," have pro-
vided a focus of inquiry for subsequent cases faced with the same
issue raised by a multitude of various factual situations.4 4
39. "This intent, when given effect by overt act, is the gist of conspiracy.
While it is not identical with mere knowledge that another purposes
unlawful action, it is not unrelated to such knowledge. Without the
knowledge, the intent cannot exist." Id. at 711.
40. The factors articulated by the Court include quantity actually sold,
frequency of the sales, and conduct stimulating the purchases. Id.
41. Id. at 710-12. Consistent with the Court's emphasis on the illegal or
legal nature of the substance, it has been suggested in other factual
situations that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a person's
action should be a factor added to the "stake in the venture test." De-
velopments, supra note 3, at 932-33.
42. 319 U.S. at 712.
43. Id. at 712 n.8. See 53 CoLUm. L. REv. 228, 230-32 (1953).
44. United States v. Rojas, 537 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1976) (considering facts
proving frequent and large sales of drugs sufficient to sustain the find-
ing of conspiracy); United States v. Sin Nagh Fong, 490 F.2d 527 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 916 (1974) (considering the factors of mul-
tiple sales and active encouragement in sustaining the defendant's con-
viction for conspiracy); United States v. Spanos, 462 F.2d 1012 (9th
Cir. 1972) (holding that a single sale of a large amount of ampheta-
mine tablets by the defendant was insufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction for conspiracy); United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965) (considering facts proving
frequent and large deliveries of narcotics sufficient to establish a con-
spiracy); United States v. Ford, 324 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1963) (holding
that the purchase of a watch known to be stolen was insufficient to
sustain a finding that the purchaser was involved in a conspiracy to
receive stolen goods); United States v. Rich, 262 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1959) (concluding that proof of frequent sales and purchases by the
defendant of controlled substances with established members of a con-
spiracy was sufficient to sustain his conviction); United States v.
Reina, 242 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding that proof of a single large
sale of heroin was sufficient to sustain the conviction of conspiracy);
United States v. Koch, 113 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that facts
proving a single purchase of a large amount of heroin were insufficient
to support the conspiracy conviction). But see, People v. Lauria, 251
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In Dent, the Nebraska Supreme Court did not articulate the
factors it considered nor the reasoning it applied in reaching the
conclusion that both defendants intended to distribute cocaine to
third persons. The two cases cited by the court, United States v.
Bommarito4 5 and United States v. Carlson4 6 sustained conspiracy
convictions based on proof of several of the factors articulated in
Direct Sales and subsequent lower court cases.47 However, the evi-
dence presented in Dent fails to substantiate the existence of any
of the factors relied on by other courts to show intent.48 Without
Cal. App. 2d 471, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1967). The court in Lauria, in
dictum, indicated that if no legitimate use of the goods exists, a sup-
plier may be found to have entered a conspiratorial agreement to
achieve the object of another's illegal venture by mere knowledge
alone.
45. 524 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1975).
46. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
47. See notes 40 and 44 supra. In sustaining the defendant's conviction
of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, the court in Bommarito relied on
facts which proved a continuing business relationship between the con-
spirators. The defendant provided his co-conspirator, Ciraco, with a
pound of methamphetamine which Ciraco paid for as he resold it.
Further, there was proof of several transactions. The court found the
defendant to have an active stake in the outcome of the purchaser's
resales. United States v. Bommarito, 524 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1975).
In Carlson, the circumstantial evidence reasonably led to the con-
clusion that on at least two occasions the defendant supplied two co-
conspirators with cocaine. The co-conspirators sold the cocaine to
third parties and returned immediately to the defendant's empty ware-
house. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
Thus in both Carlson and Bommarito, the facts established that the
defendants were involved in more than a single sale of cocaine. The
evidence revealed a joint enterprise, or a concert of action, such that
the supplier could have been found to have intended to accomplish the
object of his agreement with the purchaser.
48. The only source of evidence which is relevant to the issue of Dent's
knowledge is the phone conversation between the defendants. Bode-
man's statement that he wanted six or seven more items may imply
the quantity of the sale and the existence of a prior transaction. How-
ever, neither implication is well-founded. Without proof of what was
being referred to in the conversation, it is difficult to substantiate that
six or seven is a large quantity. Further, the simple word 'more"
is rather scarce evidence of a course of dealing or that a prior trans-
action involved an amount for resale. The most substantial evidence
tending to prove Dent's knowledge was Bodeman's statement that he
was going to make a lot of money. This gives rise to a direct finding
that Dent knew Bodeman would probably resell the items he pur-
chased.
Thus the evidence tended to prove one single sale of items in an
unknown quantity which the seller knew the buyer would probably
try to resell. There was no evidence of frequent transactions or a
course of dealing between the defendants. There was also no evidence
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clear and unequivocal evidence of knowledge of the purchaser's
illegal purpose, one cannot be found to have intended by joint
agreement to achieve the illegal purpose.49
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The court's holding herein may be interpreted as facilitating an
enhanced number of convictions of conspiracy to distribute con-
trolled substances based on facts which circumstantially tend to
prove a single sale between two defendants. 50 Traditionally, courts
have refused to sustain charges of conspiracy based on a single sale
of contraband between two defendants because of a well-estab-
lished rule of criminal law, commonly referred to as Wharton's
Rule.51 The rule provides that: "An agreement by two persons
to commit a particular crime cannot be prosecuted as a conspiracy
when the crime is of such a nature as to necessarily require the
participation of two persons for its commission. '52 The rule seems
consistent with the purposes underlying the offense of conspiracy.53
These purposes are based on the premise that group criminal
activity is inherently more dangerous to society than individual
crime.54 Thus Wharton's Rule essentially provides that if the legis-
lature defines an offense so that it requires an agreement between
two persons, the joint nature of the offense is contemplated in
that the seller attempted to encourage resales or that he had any rea-
son to care what the buyer did with the items after the purchase.
State v. Dent, 198 Neb. 110, 110-12, 251 N.W.2d 734, 735-36 (1977).
49. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943).
50. But see State v. Bobo, 198 Neb. 551, 253 N.W.2d 857 (1977), in which
the Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's determi-
nation that the evidence sufficiently established a conspiracy agree-
ment so as to render admissible a co-conspirator's hearsay statement.
51. United 'States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354 (1926); People v. Clifton, 70 Mich.
App. 65, 245 N.W.2d 175 (1976).
52. 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEURE § 89 (1957).
53. The two primary purposes advanced to justify the distinct substantive
offense of conspiracy have been labeled the "specific object" and the
"general danger" rationales. The "specific object" rationale addresses
the notion that once an individual has agreed with others to commit
a certain criminal act, he has taken the necessary additional step be-
yond intent so as to justify state intervention. Thus conspiracy is
called an inchoate crime; regardless of whether the specific object is
committed, it is the act of agreement which is punishable. The second
purpose is addressed to the potential for harm to society which con-
tinues to exist in a criminal grouping regardless of the present offense
contemplated by the group. It is this purpose which some commen-
tators find inconsistent with Wharton's Rule. See Developments, supra
note 3, at 923-25, 954-55; Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94
(1961).
54. Developments, supra note 3, at 923.
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the punishment prescribed. There is no additional danger to society
beyond that inherent in the offense.55 Applying this rule to the
offense of distributing cocaine, which necessarily requires an agree-
ment between two persons, the same logic would lead to the con-
clusion that a conspiracy charge could not be sustained.56
Although Wharton's Rule presently exists as a judicial presump-
tion in federal courts, 57 the factual interpretation of the Nebraska
Supreme Court in this case creates a method of avoiding its remain-
ing vitality. In essence, the court in Dent, interpreted the facts
presented, which arguably may have implied a single sale of cocaine
between the defendants, to be sufficient to establish a conspiracy
to distribute cocaine to third parties because of some proof that
the seller knew the buyer would probably further distribute the
substance.58
55. W. LEFAvE & A. Scow, supra note 2, at 493. Wharton's Rule has been
said to embody legislative intent, particularly since it has had a longjudicial history which legislatures have declined to change. Develop-
ments, supra note 3, at 955.
56. People v. Clifton, 70 Mich. App. 65, 245 N.W.2d 175 (1976) (presented
with facts proving a single heroin sale, the court held that Wharton's
Rule prohibited sustaining the conviction of conspiracy to distribute
heroin between defendant-seller and defendant-buyer).
57. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975). After briefly tracing
the history and rationale of Wharton's Rule, the Court held that it has
current vitality as a judicial presumption which is rebutted by a show-
ing of contrary legislative intent. Id. at 782. In United States v.
Bommarito, 524 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1975), cited by the Nebraska Supreme
Court in Dent, the court considered the applicability of Wharton's
Rule to the facts presented. In dictum, the court seemed to indicate
that the history of the drug abuse act and the specific conspiracy
statute included within the act evidenced congressional intent to ex-
clude Wharton's Rule from applying to offenses charged under the
act. Id. at 143-44.
58. This is precisely what Judge Learned Hand refused to do in United
States v. Zeuli, 137 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1943). The indictment therein
charged several defendants with conspiracy to steal and receive gaso-
line ration books. The facts revealed that the defendant, Zeuh, pur-
chased the gasoline ration books from another defendant, knowing
they were stolen. Judge Learned Hand rejected Zeuli's contention
that Wharton's Rule prohibited the conspiracy conviction because the
conspiracy charged in the indictment was broader than the buyer-
seller transaction. However, he also rejected the United States' con-
tention that the evidence was sufficient to prove Zeuli agreed to par-
ticipate in the comprehensive conspiracy charged solely because he
knew of the stolen origin of the goods. In reversing the conviction,
Judge Hand further stated:
[A]lthough he [the defendant] knew them to be stolen, he
bought them without any purpose of securing to the thieves
the fruits of their theft; the venture, so far as he was con-
cerned, began, as it ended, with the purchase .... His mere
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The consequences of the Court's holding are magnified by the
substantive characteristics of the offense of conspiracy. 59 One who
enters into a conspiracy is liable for the reasonably foreseeable
crimes committed by every other member of the conspiracy in fur-
therance of the objectives." Further conspirators may be con-
victed and sentenced consecutively for each substantive crime and
the conspiracy agreement itself.6 '
These independent substantive characteristics which enhance the
potential for punishment render the court's reliance on a "web of
inferences" unsupported by the evidence particularly disconcerting.
It is absolutely essential in conspiracy cases for courts to insist that
circumstantial evidence as to all elements of the offense be of such
a conclusive nature as to exclude every rational hypothesis except
guilt. Such a conclusion is consistent with the statement by the
United States Supreme Court that "charges of conspiracy are not
to be made out by piling inference upon inference, thus fashioning
a dragnet to draw in all substantive crimes. '62
V. CONCLUSION
Conspiracy is probably the least easily defined of all criminal
offenses. It has been criticized as adding only confusion to
criminal law.6 3 Further, inherent in conspiracy is the potential for
enhanced punishment. Thus it is particularly important that courts
pay strict attention to the sufficiency of the evidence in conspiracy
cases.
In State v. Dent, the Nebraska Supreme Court appeared to be
knowledge that they had been stolen, made him even less a
party to their theft than his knowledge of their future disposi-
tion-had that been criminal-would have made him a party
to that disposition.
Id. at 847. Further, the Nebraska Supreme Court's reliance on United
States v. Bommarito, 524 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1975) seems to be mis-
placed. Although the court therein rejected Wharton's Rule by finding
an agreement to distribute cocaine to third persons, the facts presented
clearly revealed a continuing business arrangement in which the seller
had a great interest in the resale activities of the buyer. See note
47 supra.
59. Once a conspiracy is found to exist, several procedural implications
arise as well, including venue, joinder, and the admission of hearsay
evidence. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L.
R v. 1137, 1164-88 (1973).
60. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); Anderson v. Superior
Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 22, 177 P.2d 315 (1947). See generally Develop-
ments, supra note 3, at 994-1000.
61. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961).
62. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943).
63. Johnson, supra note 59, at 1139-41.
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less concerned with clarifying the legal elements of the crime of
conspiracy than with sustaining convictions of defendants believed
to be guilty. The court relied on a ladder of ill-founded inferences
to conclude that the specific object of the conspiratorial agreement
was the distribution of cocaine to third persons. Implicit in the
court's reasoning is a reliance on the fact that Bodeman apparently
sold cocaine to Burke after, and not before, he went to York,
Nebraska. From this fact the court apparently reasoned that the
defendants' meeting in York, Nebraska, involved a cocaine sale.
Thus the court apparently concluded that the phone conversation
between the defendants involved an agreement to distribute co-
caine. Arguably at least, the court's reliance on such tenuous infer-
ences is inconsistent with due process standards of reasonable doubt.
The court's opinion herein apparently diverges from cases
rendered in other jurisdictions regarding facts which must be ad-
duced to prove that a seller of illegal goods agreed and intended
to participate in the buyer's illegal venture. Factors relied on by
other courts, including quantity sold, frequency of sales, conduct
stimulating sales and interest in the buyer's resale, which tend to
prove a concert of action or joint enterprise, are not substantiated
by the facts presented in this case. The court's holding indicates
that future conspiracy convictions may be sustained based on evi-
dence solely tending to prove that a seller knows of the buyer's
illegal venture. This proposition, coupled with the court's reliance
on such tenuous circumstantial evidence, places the decision
rendered herein beyond the mainstream of cases in other jurisdic-
tions. The court's conclusions raise more questions in an already
confused area of law.
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